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Institutes of the Christian Religion (Vol. 2 of 2)

CHAPTER X.02

The Power Of Legislation, In Which The Pope And His Adherents Have Most Cruelly Tyrannized Over The Minds, And Tortured The Bodies, Of Men - Reading 02

IV. Therefore, as works have respect to man, so the conscience is referred to God. A good conscience is no other than an internal purity of heart. In this sense Paul says that “the end of the commandment is charity, out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of faith unfeigned.”

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In a subsequent part of the same chapter, he shows how widely it differs from simple knowledge, when he says, that “some having put away a good conscience, concerning faith have made shipwreck.”

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For in these words he implies that it is a lively zeal for the worship of God, and a sincere desire and endeavour to live a pious and holy life. Sometimes, indeed, it is likewise extended to men, as when Luke states Paul to have made this declaration—“I exercise myself, to have always a conscience void of offence toward God and toward men.”

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The apostle expressed himself in this manner, because the benefits proceeding from a good conscience do reach even to man. But strictly speaking, the conscience has respect to God alone, as I have already observed. Hence it is, that a law is said to bind the conscience, which simply binds a man without any observation or consideration of other men. For example, God not only commands the heart to be preserved chaste and pure from every libidinous desire, but prohibits all obscenity of language and external lasciviousness. My conscience is bound to observe this law, even though not another man existed in the world. The person, therefore, who commits any breach of chastity, not only sins by setting a bad example to his brethren, but brings his conscience into a state of guilt before God. The case of things, in themselves indifferent, stands not on the same ground; for we ought to abstain from whatever is likely to give offence, but with a free conscience. Thus Paul speaks of meat consecrated to idols: “If any man say unto you, This is offered in sacrifice to idols, eat not for his sake, and for conscience’ sake. Conscience, I say, not thine own, but of the other.”

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A faithful man, who, after previous admonition, should eat such meat, would be guilty of sin. But though such abstinence is enjoined on him by God as necessary on account of his brother, he still retains his liberty of conscience. We see how this law, while it binds the external act, leaves the conscience free.

V. Let us now return to human laws. If they are designed to introduce any scruple into our minds, as though the observance of them were essentially necessary, we assert, that they are unreasonable impositions on the conscience. For our consciences have to do, not with men, but with God alone. And this is the meaning of the well known distinction, maintained in the schools, between a human tribunal and the court of conscience. When the whole world was enveloped in the thickest shades of ignorance, this little spark of light still remained unextinguished, so that they acknowledged the conscience of man to be superior to all human judgments. It is true that what they confessed in one word, they afterwards overturned in fact; yet it was the will of God that even at that time there should remain some testimony in favour of Christian liberty, to rescue the conscience from the tyranny of men. But we have not yet solved the difficulty which arises from the language of Paul. For if princes are to be obeyed, “not only for wrath, but also for conscience’ sake,”

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it seems to follow, that the laws of princes have dominion over the conscience. If this be true, the same must be affirmed of the laws of the Church. I reply, In the first place, it is necessary to distinguish between the genus and the species. For the conscience is not affected by every particular law; yet we are bound by the general command of God, which establishes the authority of magistrates. And this is the hinge upon which Paul’s argument turns, that magistrates are to be honoured because they are “ordained of God.”

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At the same time he is far from insinuating that the laws enacted by them have any thing to do with the internal government of the soul; for he every where extols the service of God and the spiritual rule of a holy life, above all the statutes and decrees of men. A second consideration worthy of notice, which is a consequence of the first, is, that human laws,—I mean such as are good and just, whether enacted by magistrates or by the Church,—though they are necessary to be observed, are not on this account binding on the conscience; because all the necessity of observing them has reference to the general object of laws, but does not consist in the particular things which are commanded. There is an immense distance between laws of this description, and those which prescribe any new form for the worship of God, and impose a necessity in things that were left free and indifferent.

VI. Such are the Ecclesiastical Constitutions, as they are now called, in the Papacy, which are obtruded as necessary to the true worship of God; and as they are innumerable, they are so many bonds to entrap and insnare souls. Though we have touched on them a little in the exposition of the law, yet as this is a more suitable place to discuss them at large, I shall now endeavour to collect a summary of the whole, in the best order I can. And as we have already said what appeared sufficient respecting the tyrannical power, which the false bishops arrogate to themselves, of teaching whatever doctrines they please, I shall at present pass over all that subject, and confine myself to a discussion of the power which they say they have, to make laws. Our false bishops, therefore, burden men’s consciences with new laws under this pretext—that the Lord has constituted them spiritual legislators, by committing to them the government of the Church. Wherefore they contend, that all the commands and ordinances ought of necessity to be observed by all Christian people, and that whoever violates them is guilty of double disobedience, because he is a rebel both against God and the Church. Certainly, if they were true bishops, I would allow them some authority of this kind; not all that they demand, but all that is requisite to the maintenance of good order in the Church. But as they bear no resemblance of the character to which they pretend, the least they can possibly assume is more than their right. Yet as this has been already proved, let us admit the supposition at present, that whatever power true bishops are entitled to, belongs to them. Still I deny that they are therefore appointed as legislators over believers, with power to prescribe a rule of life according to their own pleasure, or to constrain the people committed to them to submit to their decrees. By this observation I mean, that they have no authority to enjoin upon the observance of the Church any thing that they may have invented themselves, independently of the word of God. As this power was unknown to the apostles, and was so frequently interdicted to the ministers of the Church by the mouth of the Lord, I wonder how they have dared to usurp it, and still dare to maintain it contrary to the example of the apostles, and in defiance of the express prohibition of God.