CHAPTER VII.04

X. But to put an end at once to this question, a single transaction, related by Augustine, will be sufficient to show what kind of jurisdiction was anciently possessed by the bishop of Rome. Donatus, bishop of Casæ Nigræ, had accused Cæcilianus, bishop of Carthage. The accused was condemned without a hearing; for, knowing that the bishops had conspired against him, he would not appear. The matter was then brought before the Emperor Constantine. With a view to have the cause decided by an ecclesiastical judgment, he referred the cognizance of it to Melchiades, bishop of Rome, with whom he associated some other bishops from Italy, France, and Spain. If it was part of the ordinary jurisdiction of the see of Rome to hear an appeal in an ecclesiastical cause, why did Melchiades suffer any colleagues to be appointed with him at the pleasure of the Emperor? and, moreover, why did he himself undertake the business rather at the command of the Emperor than from his own authority? But let us hear what took place afterwards. Cæcilianus was victorious. Donatus of Casæ Nigræ was convicted of calumny. He appealed. Constantine referred the appeal to the bishop of Arles. He sat in judgment on the decision of the bishop of Rome. If the Roman see possessed the supreme jurisdiction, subject to no appeal, how did Melchiades submit to such an insult, as for the bishop of Arles to be preferred before him? And who was the Emperor that did this? It was Constantine the Great, of whom they boast that he not only devoted all his attention, but employed almost all the power of his empire, to exalt the dignity of their see. We see, then, how very far the bishop of Rome was at that time from that supreme dominion which he pretends to have been given him by Christ over all Churches, and which he falsely boasts of having exercised in all ages with the consent of the whole world.

XI. I know what numerous epistles, and rescripts, and edicts, there are, in which the pontiffs have confidently advanced the most extravagant claims respecting this power. But it is also known to every person, possessed of the least sense or learning, that most things contained in them are so extremely absurd, that it is easy to discover at the first glance from what source they have proceeded. For what man of sound judgment, and in his sober senses, can suppose that Anacletus was the author of that curious interpretation, which Gratian quotes under his name—that Cephas means a head? There are many such fooleries collected together by Gratian without any judgment, which the Romanists in the present day employ against us in defence of their see; and such phantoms with which they used to delude the ignorant in the darkest times, they still persist in bringing forward amidst all the light of the present age. But I have no intention to devote much labour to the refutation of such things, which manifestly refute themselves by their extreme absurdity. I confess that there are also genuine epistles of the ancient pontiffs, in which they extol the majesty of their see by the most magnificent titles. Such are some epistles of Leo; who, though he was a man of learning and eloquence, had likewise an immoderate thirst for glory and dominion; but whether the Churches at that time gave credit to his testimony when he thus exalted himself, is a subject of inquiry. Now, it appears that many were offended at his ambition, and resisted his claims. In one epistle he deputes the bishop of Thessalonica to act as his representative in Greece and other adjacent countries; in another he delegates the bishop of Arles, or some other bishop, to be his vicar in France. So he appoints Hormisdas, bishop of Seville, his vicar in Spain. But in all cases he mentions, by way of exception, that he makes such appointments on condition that they shall in no respect infringe the ancient privileges of the metropolitans. But Leo himself declares this to be one of their privileges, that if any difficulty should arise, the metropolitan was to be consulted in the first place. These delegations, therefore, were accompanied with this condition—that there was to be no interference with any bishop in his ordinary jurisdiction, with any metropolitan in hearing appeals, or with any provincial synod in the regulation of the Churches. Now, what was this but to abstain from all jurisdiction, and only to interpose for the settlement of disputes, as far as was consistent with the law and nature of ecclesiastical communion?

XII. In the time of Gregory, this ancient custom had already undergone a considerable change. For when the empire was convulsed and torn asunder, when France and Spain were afflicted with repeated and numerous wars and distresses, Illyricum laid waste, Italy harassed, and Africa almost ruined with incessant calamities,—in order to preserve the unity of the faith amidst such a violent convulsion of civil affairs, or at least to prevent its total destruction, all the bishops round about connected themselves more closely with the bishop of Rome. The consequence was, that the power as well as the dignity of that see was greatly increased. I am not much concerned, however, respecting the methods by which this was effected. It is at least evident, that it was greater at that period than in the preceding ages. And even then it was very far from an unlimited dominion, for one man to govern all others according to his own pleasure. But the see of Rome was held in such reverence, that its authority would repress and correct the refractory and obstinate, who could not be confined to their duty by the other bishops. For Gregory embraces every opportunity of protesting, that he as faithfully maintained the rights of others, as he required them to maintain his. “Nor under the influence of ambition,” says he, “do I withhold from any one that which is his right; but I desire to honour my brethren in all things.”—There is not a sentence in his writings which contains a prouder boast of the majesty of his primacy than the following: “I know no bishop who is not subject to the apostolic see, when he is found in fault.” But he immediately adds, “Where there is no fault to require subjection, all are equal by right of humility.” He attributes to himself the authority to correct those who have transgressed; if all do their duty, he places himself on an equality with them. But he assumed this authority to himself, and they who were willing consented to it, while others, who disapproved of it, were at liberty to oppose it with impunity; and this, it is notorious, was the conduct of the majority. Besides, it is to be remarked, that he is there speaking of the primate of Constantinople, who had been condemned by a provincial synod, and had disregarded the united judgment of the assembly. His colleagues complained to the emperor of his obstinacy. The emperor appointed Gregory to decide the cause. We see, then, that he made no attempt to interfere with the ordinary jurisdiction; and that the very thing which he does for the assistance of others, he does only at the command of the emperor.