Institutes of the Christian Religion (Vol. 2 of 2)
CHAPTER XXIII.04
A Refutation Of The Calumnies Generally, But Unjustly, Urged Against This Doctrine - Reading 04
VIII. Here they recur to the distinction between will and permission, and insist that God permits the destruction of the impious, but does not will it. But what reason shall we assign for his permitting it, but because it is his will? It is not probable, however, that man procured his own destruction by the mere permission, and without any appointment, of God; as though God had not determined what he would choose to be the condition of the principal of his creatures. I shall not hesitate, therefore, to confess plainly with Augustine, “that the will of God is the necessity of things, and that what he has willed will necessarily come to pass; as those things are really about to happen which he has foreseen.” Now, if either Pelagians, or Manichæans, or Anabaptists, or Epicureans, (for we are concerned with these four sects on this argument,) in excuse for themselves and the impious, plead the necessity with which they are bound by God’s predestination,—they allege nothing applicable to the case. For if predestination is no other than a dispensation of Divine justice,—mysterious indeed, but liable to no blame,—since it is certain they were not unworthy of being predestinated to that fate, it is equally certain, that the destruction they incur by predestination is consistent with the strictest justice. Besides, their perdition depends on the Divine predestination in such a manner, that the cause and matter of it are found in themselves. For the first man fell because the Lord had determined it was so expedient. The reason of this determination is unknown to us. Yet it is certain that he determined thus, only because he foresaw it would tend to the just illustration of the glory of his name. Whenever you hear the glory of God mentioned, think of his justice. For what deserves praise must be just. Man falls, therefore, according to the appointment of Divine Providence; but he falls by his own fault. The Lord had a little before pronounced “every thing that he had made” to be “very good.” Whence, then, comes the depravity of man to revolt from his God? Lest it should be thought to come from creation, God had approved and commended what had proceeded from himself. By his own wickedness, therefore, he corrupted the nature he had received pure from the Lord, and by his fall he drew all his posterity with him into destruction. Wherefore let us rather contemplate the evident cause of condemnation, which is nearer to us in the corrupt nature of mankind, than search after a hidden and altogether incomprehensible one in the predestination of God. And we should feel no reluctance to submit our understanding to the infinite wisdom of God, so far as to acquiesce in its many mysteries. To be ignorant of things which it is neither possible nor lawful to know, is to be learned: an eagerness to know them, is a species of madness.
IX. Some one perhaps will say, that I have not yet adduced a sufficient answer to that sacrilegious excuse. I confess it is impossible ever wholly to prevent the petulance and murmurs of impiety; yet I think I have said what should suffice to remove not only all just ground, but every plausible pretext, for objection. The reprobate wish to be thought excusable in sinning, because they cannot avoid a necessity of sinning; especially since this necessity is laid upon them by the ordination of God. But we deny this to be a just excuse; because the ordination of God, by which they complain that they are destined to destruction, is guided by equity, unknown indeed to us, but indubitably certain. Whence we conclude, that they sustain no misery that is not inflicted upon them by the most righteous judgment of God. In the next place, we maintain that they act preposterously, who, in seeking for the origin of their condemnation, direct their views to the secret recesses of the Divine counsel, and overlook the corruption of nature, which is its real source. The testimony God gives to his creation prevents their imputing it to him. For though, by the eternal providence of God, man was created to that misery to which he is subject, yet the ground of it he has derived from himself, not from God; since he is thus ruined solely in consequence of his having degenerated from the pure creation of God to vicious and impure depravity.
X. The doctrine of God’s predestination is calumniated by
its adversaries, as involving a third absurdity. For when we
attribute it solely to the determination of the Divine will, that
those whom God admits to be heirs of his kingdom are exempted
from the universal destruction, from this they infer, that he
is a respecter of persons, which the Scripture uniformly denies;
that, therefore, either the Scripture is inconsistent with itself,
or in the election of God regard is had to merits. In the first
place, the Scripture denies that God is a respecter of persons,
in a different sense from that in which they understand it; for
by the word person, it signifies not a man, but those things in
a man, which, being conspicuous to the eyes, usually conciliate
favour, honour, and dignity, or attract hatred, contempt,
and disgrace. Such are riches, wealth, power, nobility, magistracy,
country, elegance of form, on the one hand; and on the
other hand, poverty, necessity, ignoble birth, slovenliness, contempt,
and the like. Thus Peter and Paul declare that God
is not a respecter of persons, because he makes no difference
between the Jew and Greek, to reject one and receive the
other, merely on account of his nation. [508] [509] [510] [511]