CHAPTER V.07

XIV. They argue also from the manner of expression which is invariably observed, both in the Scripture and in the common conversation of mankind. For good actions are called our own, and we are said to perform what is holy and pleasing to the Lord, as well as to commit sins. But if sins be justly imputed to us, as proceeding from ourselves, certainly some share ought to be, for the same reason, assigned to us also in works of righteousness. For it would be absurd that we should be said to do those things, to the performance of which, being incapable of any exertion of our own, we were impelled by God, as so many stones. Wherefore, though we allow the grace of God the preëminence, yet these expressions indicate that our own endeavours hold at least the second place. If it were only alleged, that good works are called our own, I would reply, that the bread which we pray to God to give us, is called ours. What will they prove by this term, but that what otherwise by no means belongs to us, becomes ours through the benignity and gratuitous munificence of God? Therefore let them either ridicule the same absurdity in the Lord's prayer, or no longer esteem it ridiculous, that good works are denominated ours, in which we have no propriety but from the liberality of God. But there is rather more force in what follows; that the Scripture frequently affirms that we ourselves worship God, work righteousness, obey the law, and perform good works. These being the proper offices of the understanding and will, how could they justly be referred to the Spirit, and at the same time be attributed to us, if there were not some union of our exertions with the grace of God? We shall easily extricate ourselves from these objections, if we properly consider the manner in which the Spirit of the Lord operates in the saints. The similitude with which they try to [pg 300] cast an odium on our sentiments, is quite foreign to the subject; for who is so senseless as to suppose that there is no difference between impelling a man, and throwing a stone? Nor does any such consequence follow from our doctrine. We rank among the natural powers of man, approving, rejecting; willing, nilling; attempting, resisting; that is, a power to approve vanity, and to reject true excellence; to will what is evil, to refuse what is good; to attempt iniquity, and to resist righteousness. What concern has the Lord in this? If it be his will to use this depravity as an instrument of his wrath, he directs and appoints it according to his pleasure, in order to execute his good work by means of a wicked hand. Shall we, then, compare a wicked man who is thus subservient to the Divine power, while he only studies to gratify his own corrupt inclination, to a stone which is hurled by an extrinsic impulse, and driven along without any motion, sense, or will of its own? We perceive what a vast difference there is. But how does the Lord operate in good men, to whom the question principally relates? When he erects his kingdom within them, he by his Spirit restrains their will, that it may not be hurried away by unsteady and violent passions, according to the propensity of nature; that it may be inclined to holiness and righteousness, he bends, composes, forms, and directs it according to the rule of his own righteousness; that it may not stagger or fall, he establishes and confirms it by the power of his Spirit. For which reason Augustine says, “You will reply to me, Then we are actuated; we do not act. Yes, you both act and are actuated; and you act well, when you are actuated by that which is good. The Spirit of God, who actuates you, assists those who act, and calls himself a helper, because you also perform something.” In the first clause he inculcates that the agency of man is not destroyed by the influence of the Spirit; because the will, which is guided to aspire to what is good, belongs to his nature. But the inference which he immediately subjoins, from the term help, that we also perform something, we should not understand in such a sense, as though he attributed any thing to us independently; but in order to avoid encouraging us in indolence, he reconciles the Divine agency with ours in this way; that to will is from nature, to will what is good is from grace. Therefore he had just before said, “Without the assistance of God, we shall be not only unable to conquer, but even to contend.”

XV. Hence it appears that the grace of God, in the sense in which this word is used when we treat of regeneration, is the rule of the Spirit for directing and governing the human will. He cannot govern it unless he correct, reform, and renovate [pg 301] it; whence we say that the commencement of regeneration is an abolition of what is from ourselves; nor unless he also excite, actuate, impel, support, and restrain it; whence we truly assert, that all the actions which proceed from this are entirely of the Spirit. At the same time, we fully admit the truth of what Augustine teaches, that the will is not destroyed by grace, but rather repaired; for these two things are perfectly consistent—that the human will may be said to be repaired, when, by the correction of its depravity and perverseness, it is directed according to the true standard of righteousness; and also that a new will may be said to be created in man, because the natural will is so vitiated and corrupted, that it needs to be formed entirely anew. Now, there is no reason why we may not justly be said to perform that which the Spirit of God performs in us, although our own will contributes nothing of itself, independently of his grace. And, therefore, we should remember what we have before cited from Augustine, that many persons labour in vain to find in the human will some good, properly its own. For whatever mixture men study to add from the power of free will to the grace of God, is only a corruption of it; just as if any one should dilute good wine with dirty or bitter water. But although whatever good there is in the human will, proceeds wholly from the internal influence of the Spirit, yet because we have a natural faculty of willing, we are, not without reason, said to do those things, the praise of which God justly claims to himself; first, because whatever God does in us, becomes ours by his benignity, provided we do not apprehend it to originate from ourselves; secondly, because the understanding is ours, the will is ours, and the effort is ours, which are all directed by him to that which is good.

XVI. The other testimonies, which they rake together from every quarter, will not much embarrass even persons of moderate capacities, who have well digested the answers already given. They quote this passage from Genesis: “Unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him;”727 or, as they would translate the words, “Subject to thee shall be its appetite, and thou shalt rule over it;” which they explain to relate to sin, as though the Lord promised Cain, that the power of sin should not obtain dominion over his mind, if he would labour to overcome it. But we say that it is more agreeable to the tenor of the context, to understand it to be spoken concerning Abel. For the design of God in it is to prove the iniquity of that envy, which Cain had conceived against his brother. This he does by two reasons: first, that [pg 302] it was in vain for him to meditate crimes in order to excel his brother in the sight of God, with whom no honour is given but to righteousness; secondly, that he was extremely ungrateful for the favours God had already conferred on him, since he could not bear his brother, even though subject to his authority. But that we may not appear to adopt this explanation, merely because the other is unfavourable to our tenets, let us admit that God spake concerning sin. If it be so, then what the Lord there declares, is either promised or commanded by him. If it be a command, we have already demonstrated that it affords no proof of the power of men: if it be a promise, where is the completion of the promise, seeing that Cain fell under the dominion of sin, over which he ought to have prevailed? They will say, that the promise includes a tacit condition, as though it had been declared to him that he should obtain the victory if he would contend for it; but who can admit these subterfuges? For if this dominion be referred to sin, the speech is doubtless a command, expressive, not of our ability, but of our duty, which remains our duty even though it exceed our ability. But the subject itself, and grammatical propriety, require a comparison to be made between Cain and Abel; in which the elder brother would not have been placed below the younger, if he had not degraded himself by his own wickedness.